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Abstract. Empirical studies of commercial relationships between firms reveal that (i) suppliers en-
counter situations in which they can gain in the short run by acting opportunistically—for example,
delivering a lower quality than promised after being paid; and (ii) good conduct is sustained not exclu-
sively by formal contracts but through informal relationships and the expectation of future business.
In such relationships, the need to offer each supplier a large enough share of future business to deter
cheating limits the number of supply relationships each buyer can sustain. The market thus becomes
networked, with trade restricted to durable relationships. We propose and analyze a simple dynamic
model to examine the structure of such overlapping relational contracts in equilibrium. Due to exoge-
nous stochastic shocks, suppliers are not always able to make good on their promises even if they wish
to, and so links are constantly dissolving and new ones are forming to take their place. This induces
a Markov process on networks. We study how the stationary distribution over networks depends on
the parameters—most importantly, the value of trade and the probability of shocks. When the rate
at which shocks hit increases, as might happen during an economic downturn, maintaining incentive
compatibility with suppliers requires promising each more future business and this necessitates main-
taining fewer relationships with suppliers. This results in a destruction of social capital, and even if
the rate of shocks later returns to its former level, it can take considerable time for social capital to be
rebuilt because of search frictions. This creates a novel way for shocks to be persistent. It also suggests
new connections between the theory of relational contracting, on the one hand, and the macroeconomic
analysis of recessions, on the other.
1 Introduction
Relationships play a crucial role in the functioning of many markets. In the overnight lending market
that banks rely on for liquidity, the same banks trade repeatedly with each other [5]; agricultural
traders in Madagascar rely heavily on social relationships to conduct business [9]; medieval Maghribi
traders utilized their social network to trade over long distances [11]; manufactures in the Japanese
electronic industry rely on durable relationships with their suppliers [17]; and so on.
Building on the pioneering work of [10], an extensive literature in sociology shows that a primary
function of these relationships is to help overcome short-term incentives to act opportunistically
(see, for example, [22]). Common understandings of acceptable actions seem to limit opportunistic
behavior and stabilize trade (e.g., [14]).4 The relational contracting literature in economics has
developed tools for modeling these kinds of informal understandings. However, with some important
exceptions that we will discuss below, these models are typically limited to analyzing a single
relationship or else the relationships of a single individual (say, buyer), and have stopped short or
providing a theory of networked markets. This paper proposes a first model of market relationships
made up of overlapping relational contracts.
4 Measuring trust by the size of trade credit, [14] find evidence for relationships replacing formal contracts in
Vietnam.
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3049512 
2
Viewing business relationships as social capital, and formalizing the role they play in facili-
tating trade, raises new questions. What is the dynamic impact of shocks on the stock of social
capital? Does the mistrust associated with turbulent economic times destroy social capital, and
if so, how does the structure of the relational contracts relate to the extent of destruction? The
typical approach economists have taken in modeling the formation of networked markets does not
permit such questions to be addressed. For example, [13] and [8] model relationships as partner-
specific costly investments, abstracting from the roles relationships play in sustaining cooperative
behavior. This limits the ability of this theory to consider the dynamic response of the network to
shocks and policy interventions. Taking a more dynamic approach, based on relational contracting,
complements the parsimonious static models.
We now describe the essentials of our model. Each of many principals (buyers) needs the services
of one agent (supplier) every period. A buyer observes who has the capacity to fulfill her order and
chooses one agent to trade with. The model features moral hazard: because contracts are incomplete
and cannot cover every contingency, agents can act opportunistically (“defect”) and seize surplus
at the buyer’s expense. In an incentive-compatible relational contract, to prevent such behavior,
an agent’s good conduct must yield an expectation of trading sufficiently frequently in the future.
That is, the principal must promise future business after successful trade, and the expected value of
that business must exceed the short-term gain of opportunism. The need to promise a large enough
share of future surplus limits the number of agents with whom a principal can sustain successful
trade. Thus, the market becomes networked, with each supplier having a subset of insiders who
currently enjoy favored status. The final key ingredient of the model is that exogenous shocks may
cause a trade to fail through no fault of the supplier’s. When a shock hits, even if the agent acted
in good faith and did not defect, the outcome observed by the principal is as if the supplier had
defected. Because the principal cannot distinguish such shocks from opportunistic cheating, the
shocks must also lead to a disruption in the supplier’s favored status; otherwise there would be no
deterrent to defection. Thus, insider relationships are sometimes destroyed. We posit a frictional
process of principals’ matching to new agents to as channel that can replace the lost relationships.
In general, the best relational contract for a principal in our model will be complex, rely on the
fine details of the history, and involve randomizations, thus treating identical situations quite differ-
ently. Such relational contracts have two disadvantages. First, they stretch to an implausible extent
the important practical constraint that contracts must be underpinned by common understandings
of expected conduct. Second, they require the principal to be able to commit to intricate credible
randomizing devices—something that is difficult to audit and rarely observed in practice. Instead of
characterizing optimal contracts with these properties, we define a class of simple contracts that are
easy for agents to understand and audit. The conditions we use to do this are intuitive and, when
the principal optimizes within this class, lead to natural relational contracts. At the same time, the
restrictions placed on the contracting space make the search for an optimal contract tractable, and
allow us to study its properties.
The contracts we find to be optimal within our restricted class are characterized by three
features. First, principals maintain relationships with a set of insiders, who are treated equally and
receive priority as trading partners. Second, when no such insider is available for trade, the principal
instead searches for an outsider to trade with as long as the current insider set is not too large.
Finally, successful trade by an agent is always rewarded by insider status, while unsuccessful trade is
always punished with outsider status. This simple structure is consistent with stylized facts. Given
these contracts, new relationships are formed and existing relationships lost in a dynamic process
creating a dynamic networked market, which we study. Formally, we analyze a Markov process on
3a set of networks that the relational contracts induce. We show how this random bipartite graph
depends on the parameters of the problem.
The main questions concern how the behavior of the dynamic market depends on exogenous
disruption. There are two ways in which such disruptions matter. First, when shocks are realized,
there is a destruction of social capital, and restoring it takes time due to search frictions. Beyond the
mechanical delay involved in meeting new agents, maintaining incentive-compatibility also implies
prioritizing the remaining relationships, which delays the replacement of terminated relationships.
This creates a novel source of persistence for shocks. Second, if the probability of shocks increases,
the value of future trade decreases, and buyers are able to maintain fewer relationships, because
they have less overall future surplus to divide. These forces suggest new connections between the
theory of relational contracting on the one hand, and the macroeconomic analysis of recessions,
on the other. We view relational contracts disrupted by shocks as a sort of “social” or network
capital—an important input into production that is lost suddenly and replaced gradually.
There is a large related empirical literature in economics and sociology documenting the im-
portance of relationships in markets. Beyond the examples already mentioned, [12] document that
restaurateurs, particularly those from higher-end restaurants, purchase repeatedly from a small
number of vendors. [18] and [19] find that the relationships between small firms and institutional
creditors are crucial for gaining access to financing and that firms attempting to access many cred-
itors face higher interest rates and end up having less access to credit. Similarly, [6] document the
importance of relationships for accessing interbank lending markets and find that these relationships
are especially important for distressed and smaller banks.
We now discuss the most closely related theoretical work. A few papers in the relational con-
tracting literature have considered the relationships between a producer and her suppliers. The
most closely related among these are [4] and [3]. [4] finds that an organization may prefer to main-
tain a limited number of strong relationships with suppliers rather than trading with the lowest-cost
supplier in each period. This is the inspiration for our notion of insiders. [3] show that it can be
optimal for an organization to favor suppliers that it has more recently traded with over others.
In both these cases, the focus is on the interaction of a single principal (e.g., organization) with
several agents (e.g., suppliers). However, the inclusion of multiple principals is crucial for developing
a relational-contracting theory of networked markets and considering the effects of shocks on the
market as a whole.
Our paper also related to the static mechanism design literature on competing mechanisms
and to the dynamic games literature. [20] consider repeated relationships and use of transfers in
sustaining them. Several recent papers also consider cooperation in networks [1, 2, 23, 16]. For a
survey, see [15]. A key difference between these papers and the present one is that the networks we
consider are dynamic and endogenously determined by relational contracts rather than exogenous
constraints on interactions that are taken as given.
Finally, there is a literature on macroeconomics and social capital (e.g. [21, 7]). This literature
does not provide microfoundations for social capital, while we do. Moreover, the microfoundations
we provide are crucial for understanding the aggregate dynamic impact of shocks on social capital.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model, focusing on the
interaction setting and the timing of decisions. We analyze payoffs and incentive-compatibility in a
general contracting space and then define simpler contracts and describe their basic properties. In
Section 3, we provide an equilibrium characterization in this simpler contracting space and derive
comparative statics and welfare results. The proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
42 Model
There is a continuum of principals and a continuum of agents, also called suppliers. We normalize
the measure of principals to 1 and let x be the measure of agents. There are infinitely many discrete
time periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}. The principal and all agents have a utility equal to the discounted
sum (with discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1)) of period payoffs, which we are about to define.
At each time, each principal j is associated with a set of agents Ijt called insiders, and if we
interpret this set as the neighborhood of j, the neighborhoods define a bipartite network of trading
relationships.
2.1 Timing within a period and payoffs
We now present the timing of the model within each period t.
(i) Each principal is matched to one outsider uniformly at random.5
(ii) Each agent is either available to trade or not. The probability that any agent is available is α.
The availability realizations are independent across agents and observable by the principal, all
insiders, and the outsider.
(iii) Simultaneously, each principal chooses at most one agent to trade with: this may be an available
insider, the matched outsider, if available, or nobody. The indicator variable corresponding to
principal j selecting agent i at time t is denoted by Qjit ∈ {0, 1}, where
∑
iQ
j
it ≤ 1 for each j.
If j selected i, we also say that j initiated trade with i.
(iv) For each principal-agent pair (j, i) with Qji = 1—i.e., where the principal has selected the
agent—a shock is realized with probability q. In case the shock is realized, the agent cannot
produce for the principal. The surplus v˜t available in that relationship in that period is thus
v˜jit =
{
0 w.p. q
v w.p. 1− q,
where v > 0 is a parameter of the model. The realization of v˜jit is observed by the selected agent,
i, at time t, but not by the principal j.
(v) The selected agent chooses whether to defect in period t on principal j or not. If the agent
defects, he receives v˜jit, leaving the principal with nothing. If the agent does not defect (the
agent cooperates), he receives
p˜jit =
{
0 if v˜jit = 0
p if v˜jit = v,
where p is a parameter of the model. We assume p < v.
(vi) The principal observes the amount left to him by the agent, v˜jit− p˜jit, and if either the shock has
occurred or if the agent has defected (i.e., if v˜jit− p˜jit 6= v− p), the principal incurs a cost c > 0.
The principal then selects her insider set for next period, Ijt+1. This consists of an arbitrary
subset of Ijt and can also include the outsider, if the principal traded with the outsider.
At the end of each period, the actions of the principal and success of trade are observed by the
principal, the insiders, and the outsider. Interactions within a principal’s neighborhood are not
observed by anyone outside it, and there is no cheap talk technology.6
5 There is no limit on how many principals an agent may be matched to through this process.
6 Our continuum assumptions effectively rule out the prospect of interesting “communication” or “reporting” strate-
gies of any kind, even through actions. No player in a given interaction will meet, with positive probability, anyone
that his or her current partners will ever meet.
5Discussion of Timing and Primitives The model features moral hazard: because contracts are
incomplete—not every contingency can be described in the contract—there is an opportunity for
the agent to act to benefit himself at the principal’s expense. This is reflected in the model by the
ability of an agent to ‘hold up’ the principal, i.e. he can keep the produced good of value v > p for
himself and the principal is not able to directly observe whether this is due to cheating or to the
production shock hitting with probability q.
For the moment, the notion of insiders simply captures the idea that the principal is not able to
contact every potential agent, and can trade at most with those she has met before.7 In the class of
contracts we study, the insiders correspond to the suppliers who have priority in being considered
to trade at a given time. The axioms defining the restricted class of contracts we study will give
additional operational content to this notion.
The key tool a principal has for incentivizing a selected agent not to defect is the choice of
whether to retain that agent as an insider for the next period. This captures the idea that buyers
can choose to fire a preferred supplier when trade with that supplier is unsuccessful.
The notion of availability corresponds to the idiosyncratic realization of whether a given supplier
has the skills and resources to fulfill the buyer’s needs. When there is no available supplier among
a principal’s insiders the principal can search for an outsider supplier. To capture the idea that this
search is not frictionless, we assume that in a given period the principal is only able to sample one
outsider. But this outsider also faces the same kind of availability draw that the insiders do: he
may not be able to take the buyer’s order.
The cost c incurred by the principal when either the shock or defection occurs might reflect
lost upfront payments made to the agent that cannot be recovered (another aspect of incomplete
contracts), revenues that the principal loses, or costs the principal incurs because her suppliers
don’t deliver.
2.2 Efficiency benchmark
The constrained-efficiency benchmark we will consider is one in which the agent cannot defect, and
thus trade will occur if there is no shock. In this case, it is optimal for a principal never to fire any
agents, to add every outsider she meets to her insider set, and thus eventually to have an arbitrarily
large insider set. This makes it overwhelmingly likely, in the long run, that at least one agent is
available, and the expected surplus per principal achieved per period is v(1− q)− qc.
2.3 General contracts and the agent’s problem
Next, we formalize the incentives facing the agents and the principal. Here and at many points
throughout, we will focus on a particular principal, dropping the superscript j. Recall Qit is an
indicator variable specifying whether the principal selects agent i in period t or not. The principal’s
history at the end of period t is denoted by ht = {hτ}τ≤t. Because the principal’s actions and the
success of trade are publicly observed, hτ = (Iτ , Aτ , i, v˜τ − p˜τ ), where Iτ is the set of insiders of the
agent in period τ , the set Aτ contains the agents available to the principal in that period, the index
i indicates the identity of the agent selected by the principal (and may be equal to ∅, corresponding
to nobody), and v˜τ − p˜τ ∈ {v − p, 0} reveals the success of the trade.8
A relational contract Γ is pair (γ, η) along with a strategy for the agent. Here, γ describes
the selection strategy: it is a mapping from ht−1 ∪ At into the space of probability distributions
7 Note the principal may retain every agent ever encountered in her insider set, which simply acts as a “Rolodex”
in this case.
8 Here an outsider who ends up unavailable is considered unobserved; this makes no difference to any of our results.
6over available agents, ∆(At). The other component, η, describes the retention strategy, and is a
mapping from ht into (i) distributions over subsets of It ∪ {O}, when trade in period t was with
the outsider; or (ii) distributions over subsets of It otherwise. This identifies which agents will be
insiders for the next period. This completes the description of the principal’s strategy. A strategy
for the agent, which is also part of a relational contract, specifies an action for every agent history.
We will sometimes omit the description of an agent’s behavior when it is clear what it should be.
Suppose an agent i is selected to trade with a particular principal in period t. To make the
agent’s problem separable across principals, we make our first assumption:
Assumption 1 (Infinite supplier capacity) Each supplier (agent) can simultaneously supply
any number of principals, and payoffs within a period are additively separable across principals.
This infinite supply assumption simplifies the analysis when agents are selected by multiple
principals at once. It means that principals need not care about the employment status of the
agents, and whom else they are matched to as outsiders. From the supplier’s perspective, the
combination of unlimited capacity and additively separable payoffs means that each agent can
optimize separately in every relationship with a principal9.
Now, returning to our selected agent i, let Vi(h
t) be i’s continuation value, given a relational
contract, after history ht. If no shock hits the agent (which happens with probability 1− q), then
that agent’s value from attempting to trade with the principal is
p+ δVi(h
t),
where ht = ht−1 ∪ {At, i, v − p} and δ < 1 is the discount factor representing time preferences. If
agent i instead defects after being selected to trade with the principal, the agent receives
v + δVi(h
t),
where ht = ht−1 ∪ {At, i, 0}.
Likewise, if a shock hits the agent (which occurs with probability q), then the agent receives
0 + δVi(h
t),
where, again, ht = ht−1 ∪ {At, i, 0}.
2.4 Incentive-compatibility
We will now focus on incentive-compatible relational contracts. A contract is said to be incentive-
compatible if an agent’s strategy has only best responses in its support. To flesh out this condition
in our application: Fixing a relational contract, and considering an interaction with a particular
principal, the continuation value of agent i at the beginning of period t after history ht−1 is
Vi
(
ht−1
)
= E[Qit(1− q)p | ht−1 ∪At] + δE
[
Vi
(
ht
)]
, (1)
where ht = ht−1 ∪ {At, i, v − p} with probability (1− q) and ht = ht−1 ∪ {At, i, 0} with probability
q.
Conditional on trading in period t with the principal, the relational contract with that principal
induces a probability distribution over whether agent i will be selected to trade in each subsequent
9 There are interesting implications of relaxing this assumption and they are explored in a longer version of this
paper.
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in period s by ρ(s | t, Γ ). We then have that for an agent selected to trade in period t,
Vi
(
ht−1
)
= (1− q)p+
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−tρ(s | t, Γ )(1− q)p. (2)
Incentive-compatibility can therefore be represented by
(v − p) ≤
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−tρ(s | t, Γ )(1− q)p. (3)
Without loss of generality, we can set p = λv for some λ ∈ [0, 1) and we get
(1− λ)
(1− q)λ ≤
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−tρ(s | t, Γ ). (4)
The formulation emphasizes that incentive-compatibility is determined entirely by the frequency
with which an agent is selected to trade in the future. Moreover, in order for an agreement to be
incentive-compatible for all agents, the principal must commit to trade with all of them sufficiently
often in the future. This will place a limit on the number of different agents a principal can credibly
trade with.
The principal’s expected payoff from an incentive-compatible relational contract is simply
pi(ht−1) =
∞∑
s=t
δs−t
∑
i
E[Qis][(1− q)(v − p)− qc]. (5)
We assume that (1 − q)(v − p) > qc so that we are in the interesting case in which trade is
at least sometimes optimal for the principal. Thus the principal’s expected payoff is increasing in
the probability the principal selects an available agent who is incentivized to complete the trade.
Maintaining more insiders reduces the probability that there will be no agent available for trade
in a given period. On the other hand, we have seen that a principal has to commit to sufficiently
frequent future trade with a given agent to incentivize the agent not to defect and this places a
limit on how many well-incentivized agents the principal can maintain as insiders. This is the key
trade-off we study.
2.5 Simple contracts: Axioms
The need to study a simple class of contracts The purpose of this discussion is to explain why
the optimal contracts within the general class we have defined so far are likely to be complex. Indeed,
the arguably unrealistic features of truly optimal contracts motivate us to study our tradeoffs within
a simpler and more plausible class of contracts.
First, suppose that the principal punishes failed trade with probability less than 1. If there is
no public randomization device that is available, the principal is unlikely to be able to commit to
actions that are unobservable and he would like to renege on. In this case the principal would like
to always pretend that the realization of the randomization device does not require punishment.
If the principal always punishes failed trade with probability 1, then some incentive-compatibility
constraints are likely to be slack and the principal will do better by punishing with probability less
than 1.
8Second, there are likely to be further intricacies regarding which insider is selected for trade and
when. For example, as in Andrews and Barron (2016), the principal may want to prioritize trade
with insiders who recently traded (in order to strengthen incentives at the time of trade). This can
lead to a complex form for γ, the probability distribution with which a principal selects an agent
to trade; indeed, γ can then depend intricately on the history of play, ht.
These observations are in tension with another feature of implicit contracts. These are often
tacit agreements where common understanding is crucial (e.g. [22], [9] or [11]). To avoid misun-
derstanding (sincere or strategic), intuition—supported by casual empiricism—suggests relational
contracts cannot be too complex.
We therefore focus on a considerably simpler, and possibly more realistic, contracting space by
requiring that a number of axioms constrain the principal.
Axioms for simple contracts First we require that the contract is simple in terms of the mutual
understanding of what is required from the agents—they are expected to never defect. Clearly a
contract in which agents frequently defect will be suboptimal because of the cost c that defection
imposes on the principal.10 However, as there are no transfers, defection could be occasionally
used as a means of transferring rents to the agents. As such defections are occasional they must
depend on the history of play in a non-trivial way, creating opportunities for misunderstandings.
This motivates the following Axiom.
Axiom 1 (No Defection on Path) A contract never permits defection of an agent.
Thus in any history reached on the equilibrium path of play, an agent’s strategy will prescribe
defection with probability 0.
Second, we require that insiders are treated equally. What it means to be an insider depends
on the difference in the way the relational contract treats them compared with outsiders. To give
insider status a simple and easily understood meaning, we require that all insiders must have the
status of a principal’s most favored supplier. Technically, this requirement ensures the continuation
values of all insiders are the same at the start of a period.
Axiom 2 (Equal Treatment of Insiders) After any history the treatment of all current insid-
ers is the same and cannot depend on the insider’s identity. Specifically, (i) under the measure
γ(ht−1 ∪At), any i, j ∈ At ∩ It are chosen with equal probability; (ii) moreover letting i denote the
selected agent, then under the measure η(ht) any other insiders j, k ∈ It have equal probabilities of
being in the retained set It+1; and (iii) the probability with which i is in It+1 depends only on the
outcome of the trade v˜t − p˜t.
Specifically, this will imply that each insider will have to be selected with the same probability
for a trade and the treatment of a selected insider after trade, in terms of being granted insider
status for the next period, will not depend on the identity of the insider selected.
Next, to give insider status further meaning, we will require that insiders are prioritized over
an outsider. A principal can never select an outsider if an insider is available. This requirement
considerably simplifies the analysis. For a principal with a very small insider set, absent this con-
straint, it may be optimal to initially favor outsiders in order to build up a larger insider set more
quickly, thereby increasing the chance that she will be able to trade with an available agent. While
this would tighten the insiders’ incentive-compatibility constraints, it may increase the principal’s
10 In practice there are often such costs representing a real loss of social surplus: for example, the failure to generate
surplus with one of the principal’s customers caused by the principal’s lack of a key input.
9expected profit. However, eventually incentive compatibility concerns will force the principal to
prioritize trade with insiders. In any case, the issue considerably complicates the task of finding
an optimal contract. While we expect this requirement to be restrictive in the present model, it
can be motivated by robustness considerations: in a model where there is limited monitoring of
the principal, she may be tempted to prioritize outsiders more often than she is supposed to. It is
easier to verify compliance with simpler contracts.
Axiom 3 (Insiders’ Priority) An available outsider can only be selected if there are no available
insiders. Specifically, under the measure γ(ht−1 ∪ At), the outsider is chosen with probability 0
whenever, It ∩At 6= ∅.
In our model, a principal can punish defection by making the selected agent an outsider (i.e.,
by “firing” the selected agent). Given the equal treatment of insiders Axiom, the principal cannot
target punishment at a specific agent while retaining that agent as an insider. Making the agent
an outsider implies that with probability 1 the agent will never be selected again by this principal,
since there is a continuum of agents. Mixing when punishing would allow the agent’s incentive-
compatibility constraint to bind, and thus may be preferable for the principal since she would in
some cases have more insiders to trade with. On the other hand, a mixed strategy is difficult to
interpret in reality. Moreover, without a public randomization device, it may be hard to maintain
the credibility of this mixed punishment strategy. The principal would like to convince the agents
they will be punished with sufficiently high probability that they never defect. But then, upon
observing a failed trade, the principal would infer that the shock must have hit and would want to
renege and not punish. To better formalize this, we now state the following definition.
Definition 1 (Principal-Credible Contract). We say that a deviation is non-detectable if it is
on the equilibrium path, i.e. if it is consistent with the strategy prescribed by the relational contract.
A relational contract is principal credible if all non-detectable deviations are weakly unprofitable.
To prevent the kind of situations described previously, we require that contracts fulfill the
following axiom:
Axiom 4 (Credibility) A contract must be principal credible.
Thus, whenever a relational contract gives the principal latitude in the actions that he can take,
then the action prescribed by this contract must be weakly preferred to all others. For example, if
the relational contract requires the principal to mix between actions, then the principal must be
indifferent between those actions.
The next remark follows from the above axiom.
Remark 1 (Punishment of Failed Trade) The principal cannot mix when punishing an un-
successful trade by setting the status of the agent in question to “outsider” for the next period. That
is, she punishes either with probability 0 or 1.
Axiom 4 also limits the ability of the principal to randomize in different ways that she also
would be tempted to game. While the principal generally likes to have more insiders, as having
more of them increases the probability of there being an available insider to trade with each period,
insiders will not typically like to share future trades with more other insiders. Thus, in order to
maximize the expected number of insiders the principal has, while respecting existing insiders’
incentive-compatibility constraints, the principal might want to mix over whether to take on an
additional insider or not. However, if this mixing probability cannot be observed, the principal
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would always like to cheat and take on the extra insider for sure, while the current insiders believe
the decision is random.
Moreover, to avoid intricate conditioning on the history of play that could otherwise proxy for
mixing and would make the relational contract complex, we have the following axiom.
Axiom 5 When At ∩ It = ∅ and O ∈ At, then the selection strategy γ can be conditioned only on
It.
An implication of both Axioms 4 and 5 is summarized in the following remark.
Remark 2 (No Mixing over New Insiders) If after a history ht there are no available insiders
and the outsider is available, the principal must initiate trade with the outsider with probability 1
or 0 and can condition that decision on the history ht only through the current number of insiders.
Further, if trade is successful, the principal must grant insider status to the outsider with probability
1 or 0.
2.6 Simple contracts: Characterization
Before stating our main characterization of optimal contracts within the restricted space we have
defined, we define a k-insider contract.
Definition 2 (k-Insider Contract). A contract with the principal’s strategy given by Γ = (γ, η)
is a k-insider contract if it has the following structure:
(i) If It ∩At 6= ∅, then each available insider is selected for trade with probability 1/|It ∩At|.
(ii) If It ∩ At = ∅ and the outsider is available, the outsider is selected (with probability 1) if and
only if |It| < k.
(iii) Successful trade is rewarded by insider status, while unsuccessful trade is punished with outsider
status.
We say a relational contract is constrained-efficient when it is incentive-compatible and max-
imizes the expected payoff of a principal among the incentive-compatible contracts that satisfy
Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 (and thus Remarks 1 and 2).
Proposition 1. A relational contract is constrained-efficient if and only if it is a k∗-insider con-
tract with k∗ given by
k∗ = max{k : Vi(k) ≥ (v − p)/δ}
where Vi(k) is an agent’s expected payoff when there are k insiders and the principal commits to a
k-insider contract.
The simple contract axioms do a lot of the work of pinning down the decisions of the principal.
Proposition 1 is an exact characterization of what our simplicity conditions imply about principal
behavior when combined with optimality within this class of simple contracts.
Even though the contracting space is much simplified, this further characterization requires
several lemmas to be proved, which is done in the following section.
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2.7 Simple contracts: Proof of characterization
We prove Proposition 1 through a series of lemmas, the proofs of which are relegated to the
appendix.
First we show that an agent i is removed from the insider set only when trade is initiated with
that agent and fails.
Lemma 1. In all constrained-efficient relational contracts, if i ∈ It and trade with i was either
not initiated in period t, or else trade with i was initiated and succeeded, then i ∈ It+1.
We next show that, given the insider priority axiom (Axiom 3), the principal will initiate trade
with an insider whenever one is available.
Lemma 2. In all constrained-efficient relational contracts, the principal initiates trade with an
insider whenever there is an available insider.
We now show that there is an upper bound on the number of insiders the principal can maintain.
Lemma 3. There exists a k¯ such that the principal cannot maintain more than k¯ insiders while
satisfying incentive-compatibility.
Lemma 3 shows that if the principal always takes on available outsiders, eventually incentive-
compatibility will be violated. We now use this lemma to show that the principal takes on available
outsiders whenever there is no available insider and trade with the outsider is incentive-compatible.
It will turn out to be incentive-compatible precisely when there are fewer than k∗ insiders.
Lemma 4. In all constrained-efficient relational contracts, there exists an integer k such that if
there are no available insiders the principal trades with an available outsider if and only if there
are fewer than k insiders and rewards successful trade with insider status.
Together, Lemmas 1 and 4, along with Axiom 4 (Remark 1), establish that part (iii) of Definition
2 must hold in all constrained-efficient relational contracts: Failed trade is always punished with
outsider status while successful trade is always rewarded with insider status.
We now turn to part (i) of Definition 2. Lemma 2, Axioms 2, 3 and 4 establish that all
constrained-efficient relational contracts satisfy part (i) of Definition 2. When at least one insider
is available, each available insider is chosen with equal probability for trade. Note that mixing here
is credible since all available insiders are homogenous and thus the principal has no incentive to
favor one in particular. Axiom 4 is thus not violated.
Part (ii) of Definition 2 holds in all constrained-efficient relational contracts by Lemma 4.
This proves that Definition 2 establishes necessary properties of a constrained-efficient relational
contract. Moreover, as under Axiom 1 there is no defection on path, Equation 5 characterizes
the principal’s expected profits in a constrained-efficient relational contract. This shows that the
principal’s expected profit is increasing in the frequency with which the principal trades and so is
increasing in k, for a k-insider contract. Letting Vi(k) be an agent’s expected payoff when there are
k insiders and the principal commits to a k-insider contract, the largest k than can be sustained
without violating incentive compatibility is
k∗ = max{k : Vi(k) ≥ v − p
δ
}.
Thus all constrained-efficient relational contracts are k∗-insider contracts. Moreover, the set
of k∗-insider contracts is nonempty and, as this pins down all the principal’s actions after every
possible history, Definition 2 with k = k∗ also provides a sufficient condition for a constrained-
efficient relational contract.
uunionsq
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3 Properties of Optimal Insider Contracts
Now that we have established the optimality of insider contracts within our space of simple con-
tracts, we can calculate a principal’s expected profit and an agent’s expected utility under a k-insider
contract, and study in detail the conditions for incentive-compatibility.
3.1 Principal’s expected profit
Even within the simple class of contracts we have described, the principal’s expected discounted
profits in any state involve an expectation over the stochastic process governing the size of the
insider set. In this section, we describe this process and the principal’s calculation.
Fix a principal j and a k-insider contract, i.e. an insider contract in which j holds a maximum
of k insiders, and in which agents cooperate whenever they are available (which is justified by the
incentive-compatibility of such contracts when k ≤ k∗). Then, recalling Equation 5, the principal’s
expected profit vector can be written as
Πj(k) = E[Q
j(k)]((1− q)(v − p)− qc) + δMP (k)Πj(k) (6)
where Πj(k) = [Πj(0, k), Πj(1, k), . . . ,Πj(k, k)]
> is the vector of expected profits when the number
of insiders is 0, 1, . . . , k; the matrixMP (k) describes transitions among states; andQ
j(k) is a vector
we are about to define.
We let Qj(d, k) =
∑
i∈I∪{O}Q
j
i (d, k) denote the indicator variable the principal choses some
agent to trade with at a given time, given that she currently has d agents in her insider set I and
aims to keep a maximum of k such insiders. Given the form of the contract, E[Qj(d, k)] is the
probability that an agent is available in state (d, k), and so
E[Qj(k)] =

E[Qj(0, k)]
E[Qj(1, k)]
...
E[Qj(k − 2, k)]
E[Qj(k − 1, k)]
E[Qj(k, k)]

=

1− (1− α)1
1− (1− α)2
...
1− (1− α)k−1
1− (1− α)k
1− (1− α)k

(7)
MP (k) is the Markov transition matrix among those different states (d, k):
MP (k) =

a0,0 a0,1 · · · a0,k
a1,0 a1,1 · · · a1,k
...
...
. . .
...
ak,0 ak,1 · · · ak,k
 , (8)
where, for 0 ≤ d ≤ k:
ad,d−1 = (1− (1− α)d)q
ad,d = (1− (1− α)d)(1− q) + (1− α)d(1− α) + (1− α)dqα
ad,d+1 = (1− α)dα(1− q).
with the exception that ak,k = (1− (1− α)d)(1− q) + (1− α)d. All other entries are 0.
Thus we have the following characterization:
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Lemma 5. In any k-insider contract where agents cooperate when they are available,
Πj(k) = (I − δMP (k))−1E[Qj(k)]
(
(1− q)(v − p)− qc). (9)
The matrix (I − δMP (k)) is a non-singular M-matrix, so its inverse is nonnegative.
We are now able to show that the principal is better off if he currently has more insiders:
Lemma 6. For any k, it holds that Πj(0, k) < Πj(1, k) < ... < Πj(k, k).
Proofs not in the main text are in the appendix.
3.2 Agent’s expected utility
An agent i’s expected utility vector from a relationship with a principal j, when this principal
commits to a k-insider contract and the agent cooperates whenever able, is
U ji (k) = (1− q)pE[Qji (k)] + δMA(k)U ji (k) (10)
where U ji (k) = [U
j
i (O, k), U
j
i (I, 1, k), . . . , U
j
i (I, k, k)]
> is the vector of utilities in all possible states
the agent can be in and
E[Qji (k)] =

E[Qji (O, k)]
E[Qji (I, 1, k)]
...
E[Qji (I, k, k)]
 (11)
is the probability that agent i will be chosen to trade with principal j in each possible state. Note
that E[Qji (I, d, k)] = αE[
1
1+nda
] where ndα ∼ bin(α, d − 1). On the other hand, E[Qji (O, k)] = 0 is
the probability the agent will be chosen again by principal j after being fired.
The Markov transition matrix MA(k) is:
MA(k) =

aO,O aO,1 · · · aO,k
a1,O a1,1 · · · a1,k
...
...
. . .
...
ak,O ak,1 · · · ak,k
 (12)
where the entries are, for 1 ≤ d ≤ k:
ad,d−1 =
(d− 1)(1− (1− α)d)
d
q
ad,d = (1− (1− α)d)(1− q) + (1− α)dqα+ (1− α)d(1− α)
ad,d+1 = (1− α)dα(1− q),
with the exception that ak,k = (1− (1− α)k)(1− q) + (1− α)k. Also,
ad,O =
(1− (1− α)d)
d
q
aO,d = 0
aO,O = 1
All other entries are 0.
Thus we have
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Lemma 7. In any k-insider contract in which i cooperates when available, the agent’s expected
utility is
U ji = (I − δMA(k))−1E[Qji (k)](1− q)p, (13)
where (I − δMA(k)) is a non-singular M-matrix.
Now we can establish:
Lemma 8. For any k, it holds that U ji (I, 1, k) > U
j
i (I, 2, k) > · · · > U ji (I, k, k).
3.3 Incentive-compatibility
Lemma 9. Given a maximum number of insiders k, a contract is incentive-compatible if, for any
d ≤ k,
p+ δU ji (I, d, k) ≥ v + δU ji (O, k) (14)
It follows from Lemma 8 that if a contract is incentive-compatible with k insiders, it is also
incentive-compatible with k′ insiders, for any k′ < k. By Lemma 6, a principal’s expected profit is
increasing in the number of insiders she keeps, k. In a principal-optimal contract, she will choose
the maximum number of insiders k such that the incentive-compatibility condition holds for that
k, or equivalently
U ji (I, k, k)− U ji (O, k) ≥
v − p
δ
(15)
Note also that from Eq. (10), it follows that U ji (O, k) = δU
j
i (O, k) and thus that U
j
i (O, k) = 0.
Thus this condition reduces nicely to U ji (I, k, k) ≥ v−pδ .
3.4 Equilibrium, comparative statics and welfare
To analyze the behavior of the entire market, we define the insider contract game by allowing all
principals to simultaneously choose, and commit to, any insider relational contracts. We look for a
Nash equilibrium of this game.
Proposition 2 (Existence and Uniqueness). There exists a unique equilibrium of the insider
contract game in which all principals choose an insider contract with k∗ insiders. To this k∗, there
corresponds a random bipartite graph with stationary principal degree distribution fk∗(d), which is
the stationary distribution of the Markov transition matrix MP (k
∗).
The steady-state distribution of the number of agents in a principal’s insider set is thus given
by fk∗(d). Therefore, in steady state, the equilibrium strategy k
∗ yields a random bipartite graph
linking the set of principals to the set of agents and fk∗(d) is the distribution of the number of
edges incident on a principal. Fig. 1 illustrates an equilibrium network in steady state.
3.5 Comparative statics and welfare
Comparative statics in k We first verify the intuitive statement that when each principal seeks
a larger number of insiders, in equilibrium each principal has a higher degree.
Proposition 3. Let k and k′ be two symmetric strategies played by all principals, and suppose
all agents cooperate when available. If k′ > k, then fk′(d)  fk(d), where  indicates first-order
stochastic dominance.
15
Fig. 1: A realization of the equilibrium random bipartite graph linking the set of principals P to the
set of agents A in steady state. The number of edges d incident on a principal follows distribution
fk∗(d). In this example, k
∗ = 3 and thus a principal cannot have degree higher than 3. An agent, on
the other hand, can have any degree. The first-best configuration–when a principal does not have
to maintain incentive-compatibility–would be the complete bipartite graph.
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Fig. 2: Cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of a principal’s degree when the targeted number
of insiders is k (i.e., k-insider contract). Model parameters are q = 0.15 and α = 0.2.
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Fig. 2 illustrates Proposition 3. We plot the CDF’s of the degree for each k. We see that for
k′ > k, Fk′(d) ≤ Fk(d) for any d, indicating that fk′  fk.
Given a symmetric strategy k followed by principals, and agents always cooperating, the welfare
(social surplus) per period is:
W (k) =
(
(1− q)v − qc)( k−1∑
d=0
fk(d)(1− (1− α)d+1) + fk(k)(1− (1− α)k)
)
. (16)
The upper bound on welfare (first-best) is W¯ = limk→∞W (k) = (1 − q)v − qc, which is reached
when α = 1. This corresponds to our efficiency benchmark.
We now show that social surplus is greater when principals maintain a larger number of insiders
who cooperate:
Proposition 4. W (k) is weakly increasing in k.
Comparative statics in q Suppose that market conditions deteriorate, making it more difficult
for suppliers to live up to their commitments. As a first pass, we can model this as a reduction in
q. How does k∗, the principal-optimal and efficient number of insiders, depend on q?
Proposition 5. Let k∗(q) be the principal-optimal number of insiders under q. For all qˆ such that
k∗(qˆ) > 0, there exits q > qˆ and  > 0 such that k∗(q) ≤ k∗(qˆ)−1 for all q > q and k∗(q) = k∗(qˆ)−1
for all q ∈ (q, q + )
Proposition 5 states that when q increases sufficiently, the corresponding k∗ is bounded by a
strictly decreasing upper bound. Moreover, this upper bound decreases by steps of size one.
Corollary 1. Let k′∗ < k∗ be the principal-optimal and efficient number of insiders corresponding
to q′ > q in Proposition 5. Then W (k′∗) ≤W (k∗).
Fig. 3 illustrates Proposition 5 and Corollary 1. We see that an increase in q leads to a rapid
decrease in the number of insiders k∗ a principal can keep while maintaining incentive-compatibility.
These lost relationships can be viewed as a destruction of social capital and are associated with
large welfare losses. Welfare is impacted by two effects: (i) the direct and continuous effect of an
increase in q on (1 − q)v − qc, seen in the slope of the W (k∗) curve; (ii) the indirect effect of a
decreasing k∗(q) as q increases, which is seen in the downward jumps of W (k∗). As a comparison,
the first best—which assumes a complete bipartite graph and also that the principal does not have
to maintain incentive-compatibility—only suffers a continuous decrease due to an increasing q.
Because of search frictions, the model involves an asymmetry in how it responds to unexpected
positive and negative changes in q. For example, for the parameters shown in Fig. 3, if the economy
enters a crisis and q suddenly rises from 0.09 to 0.12, then the principal would have to immediately
adjust the relational contracts11 in order to maintain incentive-compatibility. This would imply k∗
suddenly dropping from 9 to 2 (as per Fig. 3). This implies an immediate destruction of social
capital, quantified here by a sharp drop in welfare W (k∗) of more than 50%. However, were the
economy to unexpectedly enter a post-crisis state in which q returns to its initial value of 0.09,
rebuilding the lost social capital takes a considerable amount of time. Indeed, the principal would
11 We assume that the principal would be allowed to renegotiate contracts following the transition to an unanticipated
crisis and the associated change in q.
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Fig. 3: Principal-optimal and efficient number of insiders k∗ in equilibrium, corresponding welfare
W (k∗) and first best welfare (i.e. (1 − q)v − qc) versus the shock probability q. Other model
parameters are δ = 0.99, c = 0.2, v = 3, p = 0.5, x = 1 and α = 0.2.
now rewrite optimal contracts in which she aims to return to a maximum of k∗ = 9 insiders, but
search frictions would delay the rebuilding of her set of insiders. In Table 1, we show the expected
first-passage times (in periods) from an insider set size of 0 to a higher insider set size (columns).
We see that building up the insider set from 2 insiders (the median number of insiders in the steady
state when k∗ = 2) to 5 insiders (the median number of insiders in the steady state when k∗ = 9)
takes more 50 periods12. Search frictions limit the speed of the transition and are exacerbated
by the relational contracts, which prioritize insiders thereby relaxing their incentive compatibility
constraints.
|It|
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0 5.49 13.04 23.73 39.49 64.15 105.93 185.04 358.66 817.15
Table 1: Expected first-passage times (in periods) from a starting insider set size |It| of 0 to various
other values of |It| (columns).
12 As the process is a Markov chain, to get from 0 insiders to 5 insiders, we must first pass by 2 insiders and thus
from Table 1, the expected first-passage time from 2 insiders to 5 insiders is 64.15− 13.04 ≈ 51.
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4 Appendix
Proof (of Remark 1). Suppose the contract Γ prescribes that the principal punishes a failed trade
with probability µ ∈ (0, 1). Then punishing with a probability smaller than µ is a strictly profitable
deviation for the principal since she can keep more insiders than she would under µ and thus may
increase the frequency of future trades. Moreover, such a deviation is non detectable, as defined in
Definition 1. Indeed, agents cannot detect it by observing any history ht. The contract Γ is thus
not principal credible, and this violates Axiom 4. On the other hand, if a contract prescribes a pure
punishment strategy µ = 0 or µ = 1, then any deviation is detectable and thus there are no strictly
profitable non-detectable deviations. Such a contract is thus principal credible. uunionsq
Proof (of Remark 2). Suppose the contract Γ prescribes that, when there are no available insid-
ers, the principal hires an outsider with probability µ ∈ (0, 1). Then hiring the outsider with a
probability larger than µ is a strictly profitable deviation for the principal since she can keep more
insiders than she would under µ and thus may increase the frequency of future trades. As in the
previous proof, such a deviation is non-detectable. This contract is thus not principal credible, and
this violates Axiom 4. On the other hand, if a contract prescribes a pure hiring strategy µ = 0
or µ = 1, then any deviation is detectable and thus there are no strictly profitable non-detectable
deviations. Such a contract is thus principal credible.
That the decision to hire an outsider can only be conditioned on the current number of insiders
follows directly from Axiom 5.
That following a successful trade, insider status must be granted to the outsider with probability
0 or 1 follows from a similar credibility argument: if the contract specified that the principal granted
insider status with probability µ ∈ (0, 1), then the principal would always prefer deviating and
granting it with a higher probability since she would then be able to trade with more insiders in
future periods. Since this strictly-profitable deviation is non-detectable, then the contract is not
principal credible, whereas a contract prescribing a pure strategy µ = 0 or µ = 1 would be credible
since any deviation would be immediately detectable. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 1). Suppose, towards a contradiction, there is a constrained-efficient relational
contract Γ in which after some history ht−1, an insider is made an outsider in period t with positive
probability µ > 0, and in which i traded successfully. Equal treatment of insiders, Axiom 2, then
implies that at the start of period t − 1 all insiders are equally likely to be punished following a
successful trade under Γ . Consider an alternative contract Γ ′ that is identical to Γ , except that
µ = 0 and following history ht−1 the contract differs from Γ in the following way. Immediately after
ht−1, there is an additional insider under Γ ′ and we allow the principal to trade with an insider
when one is available under Γ ′ but no agent would be available under Γ . In addition, trade with an
outsider that would be incentive-compatible under Γ may not be incentive-compatible under Γ ′,
in which case it is not attempted under Γ ′. This continues until either: (i) a trade that would not
have occurred under Γ fails, or (ii) a trade that would have been successful with an outsider under
Γ and resulted in that outsider becoming an insider is not undertaken. Either way, by Remark 1,
after such an event there is then the same number of insiders under Γ ′ as there would be under Γ ,
and henceforth Γ ′ follows Γ exactly.
The principal prefers Γ ′ to Γ . By construction the principal has the same sequence of trades
except there are now, in expectation, additional trades. The expected value of these additional
trades is positive (1− q)(v − p)− qc > 0, and so the principal is better off.
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The contract Γ ′ is incentive-compatible. It increases trade among insiders and, by Axiom 2,
slackens insiders’ incentive-compatibility constraints. The initial contract Γ can not, therefore,
have been constrained-efficient.
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 2). Without loss of generality we suppose that before the start of the game
nature draws an infinite sequence of binary random variables, where each random variable is drawn
independently from each other and is 1 with probability 1− q and 0 with probability q. We then let
the success of initiated trade conditional with no defection follow this sequence, where 1 represents
a success and 0 represents a failure.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, there exists a constrained-efficient relational contract Γ in
which, following some history ht, the principal does not trade with an insider in period t+1 despite
there being an available insider. Axiom 3 then implies that the principal does not trade in period
t + 1. Further, by Axiom 1 all trade under this contract is incentive-compatible. Consider the
relational contract Γ ′ that is almost identical to Γ . We’ll assume and then verify that Γ ′ is also
incentive-compatible. Let Γ ′ differ from Γ in (only) the following ways. After history ht, in period
t+ 1 the principal trades with an insider. If trade is successful, the principal follows Γ henceforth.
The expected value to the principal from period t+ 2 onwards is therefore the same under Γ and
Γ ′, and as Γ was incentive-compatible from period t + 2 onwards, so is Γ ′. Also, the additional
trade in period t+ 1 yields profits for the principal of v − p and additional rents for agent i of p.
Suppose instead that the extra trade in period t+ 1 under Γ is unsuccessful. Following a given
path of availabilities, suppose the next time the principal would initiate trade under Γ is in period
s > t + 1. The only other difference between Γ and Γ ′ is that in period s trade is not initiated
under Γ ′. Suppose the agent to fail under Γ in period s is agent j. Then under Γ ′ we treat agent
j exactly as agent i would have been treated under Γ . With this adjustment, Γ ′ can again exactly
mimic Γ in terms of how each insider is treated from period s + 1 onwards. Thus an unsuccessful
trade, incurring cost c, has been moved forward from period s to period t+ 1 < s.
The net effect on the principal is a gain of (1−q)(v−p) at a cost of less than qc. Thus the principal
strictly prefers Γ ′ to Γ . Moreover, the contract Γ ′ is still incentive-compatible. Suppose that under
Γ ′ the trade forgone that would have occurred in period s under Γ is with an outsider. Then the
insiders expected continuation values at all histories weakly increase and incentive-compatibility
constraints become slacker. If instead this period s trade would have been with an insider, Axiom
2 implies that all insiders at the beginning of period t+ 1 are equally likely to trade in period t+ 1
under Γ ′, and equally likely to have lost the trade that would otherwise have occurred in period
s. Thus relative to Γ a trade is moved forward, and because δ < 1, this increases the continuation
value of all the insiders.
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 3). By Axiom 2 (equal treatment of insiders), Remark 1 (punishment of failed
trade), and Lemma 1, an insider’s expected payoff is highest when when the principal never again
trades with an outsider. In this case, the expected payoff of all remaining insiders in a given period,
when there are k > 1 insiders, is:
Vtot(k) ≡ (1− (1− α)k)[(1− q)(p+ δVtot(k)) + qδVtot(k − 1)] + (1− α)kδVtot(k).
When there is 1 insider
Vtot(1) = α[(1− q)(p+ δVtot(1))]
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and thus
Vtot(1) =
α(1− q)p
1− α(1− q)δ .
We can therefore solve this system to find an expression for Vtot(k).
An upper bound on the continuation value of any agent will then, by the equal treatment Axiom,
be Vtot(k)/k, which is decreasing in k and converges to 0 as k →∞. Denoting by Vi(k) any agent’s
expected payoff when there are k insiders, any agent’s incentive-compatibility constraint is
p+ δVi(k) ≥ v
or
Vi(k) ≥ v − p
δ
.
There thus exists a k¯ such that the IC constraint of the agent is not satisfied, i.e.
Vi(k) ≤ Vtot(k)
k
≤ v − p
δ
.
This completes the proof.
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 4). By Remark 2 the principal cannot mix over trading with the outsider and must
grant insider status following successful trade (otherwise, by Remark 2, the outsider must not be
granted insider status for sure and would choose to defect violating Axiom 1). Moreover, Remark 2
implies that d insiders can be obtained only if the Principal always trades with an available outsider
when there are d−1 insiders, all of whom are unavailable and the outsider is available. Consider two
such contracts and suppose both satisfy Axiom 1 and Remark 2. Let Γd be such a contract in which
the principal keeps at most d insiders. Let Γd+1 be a similar contract, but in which the principal
keeps at most d + 1 insiders. Under both Γd and Γd+1, the incentive-compatibility constraint of
trading agents are always satisfied by Axiom 1.
Under these two contracts, the principal trades more often under Γd+1: On all paths where there
are strictly less than d insiders, the two contracts are identical. On paths where there are d insiders
and none is available and the outsider is not available, the two contracts are identical. On paths
where there are d unavailable insiders and the outsider is available, the principal trades and earns
an expected period payoff of (1− q)(v− p)− qc > 0 under Γd+1, whereas she does not trade under
Γd. On paths where there are d+ 1 insider and only one is available, the principal trades and earns
a positive expected payoff under Γd+1, whereas she may or may not trade under Γd. Therefore Γd+1
does strictly better than Γd on some paths and the same on other paths. It is thus strictly preferred
by the principal. This is valid for all d and d + 1 such that the trading agents’ IC constrain are
always satisfied. By Lemma 3 there is a maximum such d.
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 5).
Follows directly from Eq. (6).
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 6).
For any k, we may write
Πj(d, k) =
(
E[Qj(d, k)] +
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−tM s−tP,d (k)E[Q
j(k)]
)(
(1− q)(v − p)− qc) (17)
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where M s−tP,d (k) is the d
th row in the (s − t)-period transition matrix M s−tP (k). Note that the dot
product M s−tP,d (k)E[Q
j(k)] is the probability that the principal j will be able to select an agent to
trade with at time s > t, given that she has d insiders at time t and aims to keep a maximum of k.
Let P(d˜ | d, k) be the one-period transition probability to d˜ insiders, given that the principal
currently has d insiders. P(d˜ | d, k) corresponds to the dth row MP,d(k) of the transition matrix
MP (k). It is easy to show by inspection that P(d˜ | d+1, k)  P(d˜ | d, k), where  means first-order
stochastic dominance. Equivalently, we may write MP,d+1(k)  MP,d(k). Since E[Qj(d, k)] is an
increasing function of d (see Eq. (7)), it follows that MP,d+1(k)E[Q
j(k)] >MP,d(k)E[Q
j(k)].
Now suppose that for any d and for some l > 1, M lP,d+1(k)E[Q
j(k)] >M lP,d(k)E[Q
j(k)]. Then
it follows that
M l+1P,d+1(k)E[Q
j(k)] =MP,d+1(k)
(
M lP (k)E[Q
j(k)]
)
(18)
>MP,d(k)
(
M lP (k)E[Q
j(k)]
)
(19)
=M l+1P,d (k)E[Q
j(k)] (20)
Thus, it follows by induction that for any s− t ≥ 1, M s−tP,d+1(k)E[Qj(k)] >M s−tP,d (k)E[Qj(k)] and
thus from Eq. (17), we have that Πj(d, k) < Πj(d+ 1, k).
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 7).
Follows directly from Eq. (10).
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 8).
For any k, we may write
U(I, d, k) = E[Qji (I, d, k)](1− q)p+
∑
s=t+1
δs−tM s−tA,d(k)E[Q
j
i (k)](1− q)p (21)
where M s−tA,d(k) is the d
th row in the (s − t)-period transition matrix M s−tA (k). Note that the dot
product M s−tA,d(k)E[Q
j
i (k)] is the probability that agent i will be selected for trading by principal
j at time s, given that she is in state (I, d, k) at time t.
Let P((I, d˜) | d, k) be the one-period transition probability to state (I, d˜), given that the princi-
pal currently has d insiders (i.e. P((I, d˜) | d, k) corresponds to the dth row MA,d(k) of the transition
matrix MA(k)). It is easy to show by inspection that P((I, d˜) | d+ 1, k)  P((I, d˜) | d, k), where 
indicates first-order stochastic dominance. Equivalently, we may writeMA,d+1(k) MA,d(k). Since
E[Qji (I, d, k)] is a decreasing function of d (from Eq. (11)), it follows that MA,d+1(k)E[Q
j
i (k)] <
MA,d(k)E[Q
j
i (k)],
Now suppose that for any d and for some l > 1, M lA,d+1(k)E[Q
j
i (k)] <M
l
A,d(k)E[Q
j
i (k)]. Then
it follows that
M l+1A,d+1(k)E[Q
j
i (k)] =MA,d+1(k)
(
M lA(k)E[Q
j
i (k)]
)
(22)
<MA,d(k)
(
M lA(k)E[Q
j
i (k)]
)
(23)
=M l+1A,d(k)E[Q
j
i (k)] (24)
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It thus follows by induction that for any s − t > 1, M s−tA,d+1(k)E[Qji (k)] <M s−tA,d(k)E[Qji (k)] and
thus from Eq. (21), we have that U ji (I, d, k) > U
j
i (I, d+ 1, k).
uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 9). Whenever the agent is selected, his payoff from not deviating in state (I, d, k)
is p + δU ji (I, d, k), i.e. the price he obtains from the transaction plus his continuation value after
the trade. His payoff from deviating and then reverting back to on-path play is v + δU ji (O, k), i.e.
the value of the good plus his continuation value when fired by the principal. Thus i will not have a
profitable one-period deviation if and only if p+δU ji (I, d, k) ≥ v+δU ji (O, k). Invoking the one-shot
deviation principle completes the proof.
uunionsq
Proof (of Proposition 2).
We first show that any equilibrium must be symmetric. Let Πj(d, kj) denote principal j’s ex-
pected profit in state (d, kj). It is easy to show, by an argument similar to that of Lemma 6, that
Πj(d, kj) is increasing in kj . Principal j’s optimal strategy is thus necessarily the largest k such
that U ji (I, k, k) ≥ v−pδ . From Lemma 8, it then follows that U ji (I, d, k) ≥ v−pδ , ∀d ≤ k and thus the
incentive-compatibility constraints of all insiders are satisfied.
Any k∗ such that U ji (I, k
∗, k∗) ≥ v−pδ and U ji (I, k∗+1, k∗+1) < v−pδ is an equilibrium. Note that
all principals face the same decision problem. It follows that any equilibrium must be symmetric.
Any k∗ that just precedes the crossing of U ji (I, k
∗, k∗) and v−pδ is thus an equilibrium. There
exists an equilibrium since U ji (I, 1, 1) >
v−p
δ and limk→∞ U
j
i (I, k, k) = 0 <
v−p
δ and thus there exists
a crossing. Moreover, the equilibrium is unique since U ji (I, k, k) is strictly decreasing in k and thus
there is a single crossing of U ji (I, k, k) and
v−p
δ . In this case, the unique, symmetric equilibrium
strategy followed by all principals is k∗ = max{k | U ji (I, k, k) ≥ v−pδ }.
When all principals follow strategy k∗, then in steady state, any principal’s degree (the number
of insiders she can potentially trade with) follows a distribution fk∗(d), which is the stationary dis-
tribution of the Markov transition matrix MP (k
∗). Since the Markov chain described by MP (k∗)
is time-homogenous, irreducible and all its states are positive recurrent, then this stationary distri-
bution necessarily exists and is unique.
uunionsq
Proof (of Proposition 3). Let x′ and x be distribution vectors over the support {0, 1, 2, ..., k}. We will
first show that for any x′  x, then x′>MP (k)  x>MP (k−1). Here MP (k) is the (k+1)×(k+1)
Markov transition matrix in Eq. (8) when the principal keeps a maximum of k insiders. MP (k−1)
is the Markov transition matrix when the principal keeps a maximum of k − 1 insiders with an
additional last row and last column consisting of zeros so that MP (k − 1) is a (k + 1) × (k + 1)
matrix.
First note that x′>MP (k) and x>MP (k−1) can be expressed as mixture distributions. Indeed,
let MP,d(k) be the d
th row of the transition matrix MP (k). This row corresponds to the transition
probability distribution P(d˜ | d, k). We may then write x′>MP (k) =
∑k
d=0 x
′(d)MP,d(k) and
x>MP (k − 1) =
∑k
d=0 x(d)MP,d(k − 1). Moreover, MP,d(k) MP,d(k − 1) for all d.
If x′  x, then it follows that ∑kd=0 x′(d)MP,d(k)  ∑kd=0 x(d)MP,d(k − 1) and thus that
x′>MP (k)  x>MP (k − 1). Thus, if for some l > 0, x′>M lP (k)  x>M lP (k − 1), then it follows
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that
x′>M l+1P (k) = (x
′>M lP (k))MP (k)
 (x>M lP (k − 1))MP (k − 1)
= x>M l+1P (k − 1)
Thus, by induction we conclude that x′>M lP (k)  x>M lP (k − 1) for any l ≥ 1 and x′  x. It
thus follows that the stationary distributions satisfy
fk(d) = lim
l→∞
x′>M lP (k)  lim
l→∞
x>M lP (k − 1) = fk−1(d)
By transitivity, fk′(d)  fk(d) for any k′ > k. uunionsq
Proof (of Proposition 4).
Eq. (16) can be rewritten as
W (k) =
(
(1− q)v − qc)E[g(d)] (25)
where d ∼ fk(d) and
g(d) =
{
1− (1− α)d+1 for d ≤ k − 1
1− (1− α)d for d = k
is a non-decreasing function of d. When k′ > k, then it follows from Proposition 3 that fk′  fk. It
thus follows in turn that W (k′) ≥W (k). uunionsq
Proof (of Proposition 5). Let q = max{q˜ ∈ [q, 1] : U jq˜,i(I, k∗, k∗) = v−pδ }, where k∗ is the principal-
optimal number of insiders under q. Such a q exists since U jq˜,i(I, k, k) is continuous in q˜, since
U jq˜=q,i(I, k
∗, k∗) ≥ v−pδ and since U jq˜=1,i(I, k∗, k∗) = 0.
Then ∀q′ > q, we have that U jq′,i(I, k∗, k∗) < v−pδ and thus it must be that k′∗ ≤ k∗ − 1, since
this is the only way to potentially satisfy the IC constraint. Moreover, U jq,i(I, k
∗ − 1, k∗ − 1) > v−pδ
and continuity in q˜ implies that U jq′,i(I, k
∗ − 1, k∗ − 1) > v−pδ for all q′ ∈ (q, q + ) for some  > 0.
Thus, k′∗ = k∗ − 1 for all q′ ∈ (q, q + ), since this is the greatest number of insiders for which the
incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied. uunionsq
Proof (of Corollary 1).
The result follows directly from Proposition 4. uunionsq
